1.1 The manner of distribution of a person’s property after his death is determined by the fact whether the deceased has made a Will or not. All civilised societies have recognised the right of an individual to acquire, hold and dispose of property. This right of disposal includes the right to dispose properties in a manner so as to take effect after the death of a person. Such a right can be exercised by making an instrument known as Will, during the lifetime of a person. Person making a Will in such a case is known as ‘testator’ and distribution taking place after death of the testator as per his Will is known as ‘Testamentary’ succession.

1.2 In case of a person who dies without making a Will, the property passes by inheritance as per the personal law of the deceased. Devolution of property of such a person after his death is known as ‘Intestate’ succession. In India, laws governing such intestate succession are the Indian Succession Act, 1925, (I.S. Act) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Mohammedan Law. These laws by and large provide for the manner of devolution of the properties of the deceased who has died without making a Will, amongst his legal heirs. They provide amongst other things, rules as to who are the persons entitled to receive the estate of the deceased and in what proportion. They also lay down the manner in which the estate of the deceased is to be administered.

1.3 Relevance of domicile/location of a property

For purposes of determining applicability of laws in case of a succession, it is necessary to determine the domicile of the deceased. In case of an immovable property located in India, the laws of succession prevailing in India would determine the successors of such property. In case of movable properties, the laws governing the country of domicile of the deceased would determine the successors of the property. Domicile is relevant for movable properties while location is relevant for immovable property.

1.4 Intestate succession as per personal laws

1.4.1 Hindus/Jains/Buddhists/Sikhs

Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies to persons following the above faiths. A distinction is made between a male and a female for the purposes of deciding the manner of distribution of their estates. Heirs are defined as class I, class II, Agnates and Cognates for a male Hindu while for female they are provided in S. 15 and S. 16 of the Act.

S. 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 provides that any person whose marriage is solemnised under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, succession of property of such person shall be regulated by the provisions of the IS Act. However, the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, inserted S. 21A in the Special Marriage Act which provides that where the marriage is solemnised under the Special Marriage Act of any person who professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion, with a person who professes the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion, S. 21 of the Special Marriage Act shall not apply. In conclusion, even in case of the marriage of a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain solemnised with another Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain under the Special Marriage Act, such person's succession will be governed by the Hindu Succession Act, and not by the IS Act.

Male : His property devolves upon his widow, children (including heirs of a predeceased child through such child) and mother in equal shares – each taking one share. In case where none of them are present, the property will pass to his father if he is alive and failing which to his brother, sister and other relatives specified in class II.

Female : Her property devolves upon her husband and children (including children of a predeceased child through such child) in equal shares — each taking one share. In case where none of them are present, property will pass to heirs of her husband and failing them to her mother and father, so however, a distinction is made in such a case between the properties received from the parents of the female and those which are received from the husband and the father-in-law. The latter property will pass to heirs of her husband while the former will pass upon the heirs of her father.

1.4.2 Mohammedans – Property of a Mohammedan devolves on his or her successors as per his or her personal law. However, estate of persons married under the Special Marriages Act, 1954, shall devolve as per the provisions of the Indian Succession Act.

1.4.3 Others – Properties of persons following any faith other than the Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and Mohammedans and Parsis shall devolve as per the provisions of the Indian Succession Act.

2.1 What is it ?

2.1.1 S. 2(h) of the IS Act defines a ‘Will’ as a legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death. Accordingly, a Will made during the lifetime of a person becomes effective only on his death. It is for this reason that a Will can be revoked any time during the life of the person making a Will — a testator.

2.1.2 The procedure governing the Wills in India is laid down by the IS Act, 1925. The Act provides the procedure for making, execution and administration of a Will. It applies to all the persons of any faith (except Mohammedans). The following sections of the Indian Succession Act are not applicable to Wills executed by Hindus/Jains/Buddhists and Sikhs.

S. 60 Testamentary guardian

Ss. 65 & 66 Execution of privileged Wills

S. 67 Effect of gift to attesting witness

S. 69 Revocation of Will by testator’s marriage

S. 72 Revocation of privileged Will or codicil

S. 91 Power of appointment executed by general bequest

S. 92 Implied gift to objects of power in default of appointment

S. 93 Bequests to heirs, etc. of particular person without qualifying terms

S. 94 Bequest to representatives, etc. of particular person

S. 97 Effect of words describing a class added to bequest to person

S. 99 Construction of terms

S. 100 Words expressing relationship denote only legitimate relatives or failing such relatives reputed legitimate

S. 118 Bequest to religious or charitable uses

2.1.3 Section 57 of the IS Act, 1925 provides that sections listed in Schedule III to the IS Act shall apply –

(a) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain within the territories which at the said date were subject to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal or within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Judicature at Madras and Bombay; and

(b) to all such Wills and codicils made outside those territories and limits so far as relates to immovable property situate within those territories or limits; and

(c) to all Wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain on or after the first day of January, 1927, to which these provisions are not applied by clauses (a) and (b);

Provided that marriage shall not revoke any such Will or codicil.

2.2 Certain terms

a) ‘Testator’ : a person making a Will.

b) Legatee or beneficiary : a person to whom property is given under the Will.

c) Legacy : a benefit under the Will.

d) Executor : a person appointed by the testator to execute the Will as per the provisions of the Will.

e) Attestation : an act of witnessing the execution of the Will.

f) Administrator : a person appointed by a competent authority to administer the estate when no executor is appointed or an executor appointed refuses to act as an executor.

g) Probate : a copy of a Will certified under the seal of a Court of competent jurisdiction with a grant of administration to the estate.

h) Codicil : a document which modifies or alters the provisions of the original Will.

i) Letter of Administration : a letter of the court appointing an administrator to the estate.

j) Succession Certificate : as issued by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the property of a person who has died intestate, that is without making a Will.

2.3 Who can make it — S. 59 of IS Act provides that every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by a Will. Persons who are deaf, dumb, blind and even an insane person during his sanity can make a Will. However, any person in an improper state of mind due to intoxication, illness, etc. cannot make a Will where he does not know what he is doing. Subsequent incapacity will not invalidate a Will.

2.4 Form — Except in cases of Mohammedans, a Will has to be in writing and oral dispositions are not recognised. However, a soldier on a war front can make an oral Will known as a Privileged Will. No specific form is prescribed under Indian Succession Act nor any specific language insisted upon. It can be handwritten or typed. It can be made on a plain paper.

2.5 Execution — A Will should be executed by the testator by signing or putting his mark on Will in a manner so as to clarify his intent. The act of execution by the testator should be witnessed by at least two persons acting as attesting witnesses, who must sign or put their marks in the presence of the testator. It is preferable that the signature is placed at the end of the Will. Subject to the Will being made by a competent person in writing, executed by testator and attested by at least two witnesses no other legal requisites are provided for in the Indian Succession Act.

2.6 Who can be legatees —  A testator can give his estate or part thereof to any person, whether born or unborn (subject to rule against perpetuity where ultimate legatee is preceded by a vesting in a living person), of his choice Estate can be given under a Will to trusts, organisations, etc. also. An executor appointed for administration can also be a beneficiary under a Will. A bequest to a non existent person fails. However, where it was made in favour of a person who is dead at the time of the death of the testator, estate will devolve on the legal heirs of dead person.

2.7 What can be Willed — Properties which are self acquired can be disposed of under a Will. Properties acquired by inheritance or gift, etc. and held exclusively can also be subject matter of Will. It is also possible for a member of a HUF to transfer his share in the properties of HUF under Will. Tenancy rights not being transferable should not be made a subject matter of Will. A Mohammedan under Will can bequeath only 1/3rd of his property, the remaining 2/3rds part shall devolve on legal heirs as per the Mohammedan Law. Notwithstanding this rule, a Mohammedan may bequeath his entire property under a Will provided his legal heirs otherwise entitled to his estate consent to such a disposition after his death — their consent before death is not valid.

2.8 Executors — He is a person entrusted with the duty to carry out instructions of the testator and has the power to collect, realise and distribute the estate of the deceased. There is no restrictions on number of executors but their number should be restricted to four considering the court practice. Unless otherwise empowered an executor has to invest the realised estate as per the provisions of Indian Trust Act and is also not entitled to any remuneration. On refusal of the appointed person to act as an executor, the competent court is authorised to appoint an appropriate person.

2.9 Common Clauses — Though no form is prescribed following clauses are commonly found in a Will.

a) Name, age, address, religion                b) Revocation of earlier Will

c) List of relatives                                 d) Appointment of executor

e) Discharge of obligations                      f) Legacies and bequests to persons

g) Residual estate                                 h) Testimonium

i) Execution                                         j) Witness

k) Safe custody

2.10 Revocation/Alteration —A Will can be revoked at any time by the testator during his life. A Will as per S. 69 of Indian Succession Act is revoked on marriage of the testator. This rule however, does not apply to a Will made by a Hindu or a Muslim. It is possible to alter a Will by a codicil as explained above or by correcting the original Will itself as per S. 71 of the Indian Succession Act which takes effect only if alterations were executed in the same manner as a Will was executed.

2.11 Codicil — A Will can be changed by the testator during his life time either by making a new Will after revoking an old Will or by amending the old Will by separate instrument made with the intention to make such an instrument a part of it. This new instrument is known as Codicil. S. 2(d) defines it as an instrument made in relation to a Will and explaining, altering or adding to its dispositions which shall be deemed to form part of the Will

2.12 Stamp duty — No stamp duty is payable on execution of a Will. A Will can be made on a plain paper.

2.13 Registration — Registration of a Will is optional. If desired it can be registered with the Sub-Registrar of Assurance’s office as per the provisions of S. 40 of the Indian Registration Act. A revocation of a registered Will should be registered. It is preferable to register Wills made subsequent to a registered Will. Registration grants protection and secrecy to a Will.

2.14 Deposit — Will can be deposited at option of the testator with any person of his choice including Sub-Registrar of Assurances as per the provisions of S. 42 of Indian Registration Act.

2.15 Probate — A probate is the grant of administration of the estate by the court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of Will. A probate provides the conclusive evidence (i) of the execution of a Will (ii) of the legacies and (iii) of the legal character of legatees by confirming validity of a Will. It can be granted only to an executor.

Obtaining a probate is not compulsory in cases of a Hindu and a Mohammedan unless :—

A maximum court fee of Rs. 75,000 is payable in the state of Maharashtra for obtaining a probate. However, a complete exemption is provided in that state where the Will is to be administered by an executrix (a lady executor). No time limit is prescribed for filing an application for probate. However, delay is required to be explained where filed beyond a period of three years of death.

2.16 Letter of Administration — A letter of administration can be obtained from the court of competent jurisdiction in cases where the testator had failed to appoint an executor under a Will or where the executor appointed under a Will refuses to act or where he has died before or after proving the Will but before administration of the estate.

2.17 Landmark decisions of the Supreme Court

I. Effect of nomination made under Government Saving Certificates and Life Insurance Policy. – [Vishin N. Khanchandani & Anr. v. Vidya Kachmandas Khanchandani & Anr. (246 ITR 306 SC)]

II. Hindu Succession Act – succession of property devolving from a female Hindu.– [Bhagat Ram v. Teja Singh (252 ITR 324 SC)]

III. Indian Succession Act sec. 213 and sec. 57 – Will – Does not operate only against Indian Christian – sec. 213 does not discriminate on basis of religion. – [Clarence Pais v. Union of India (AIR 2001 SC 1151)]

IV. Will provided uneven distribution of assets is valid. – [S. Sundaresa Pai v. Mrs. Sumangal T. Pai (2001 (8) SCALE 309)]

V. Disposition intra vivos by gift of undivided share or interest in coparcenery property without consent of the coparceners : Gift does not partake character of Testamentary Succession u/s. 30 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. – [Pavitri Devi & Anr. v. Darbari Singh & Other (1993 4 SCC 392)]

VI. Interpretation of Will – Distinction between vested interest and contingent interest created by Will. – [Usha Subbarao v. B.N. Vishveswaraiah & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 201]

VII. Proving of Will — If evidence adduced is legal and convincing, satisfies the conscience of the court and there is nothing unnatural about the transaction, mere conjecture or unfounded suspicion should not be permitted to sway the verdict that the will has been proved — Witness being classmate of the son of the legatee would be interested in obliging his classmate’s mother so as to benefit her and go to the extent of falsely deposing was too far-fetched an inference to draw — There is no rule of law or of evidence which requires a doctor to be kept present when a Will is executed – [Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage (2002) 2 SCC 85]

VIII. Bequest in favour of wife — Absolute interest or limited right bequeathed — If property is given with a right of alienation, held, bequest is a conferment of an absolute estate — Having granted absolute right or interest to a devisee it is not open to the testator to further bequeathed the same property in favour of someone else — Therefore, any subsequent bequest in the same Will in favour of someone else would be invalid — However, if the Will clearly indicates that only a limited or restricted right is being bequeathed to the wife, then a subsequent bequest, in favour of someone else to take effect after the death of the wife would be valid. – [Mauleshwar Mani & Ors. v. Jagdish Prasad & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 468].

IX. In view of section 63 and the proviso to sec. 68 of the Evidence Act, the requirement of law would be fully satisfied if only one of the attesting witnesses is examined to prove the Will – (Ramabai Padmakar Patil v. Rukminibai Vishnu Vekhande (2003 AIR SCW 4018).

X. Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, restriction on an Indian Christian having a nephew or niece or any nearer relative to bequeath his property for religious or charitable use is struck down as unconstitutional. Their Lordships further observed that the word ‘relative’ means legitimate relative and has no application to any relationship by marriage. Thus a wife of a person is not his relative but an adopted is. – [John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003 AIR SCW 3536)].

XI. Succession Act, 1925, Ss. 63, 70 – S. 68 Proviso – Codicil – Execution and attestation of – Must be in same manner as a Will – Since codicil is an instrument made in relation to a Will.

Attestation of codicil – Registrar of deeds cannot be ‘statutory attesting witness’ to codicil merely by discharging duties of registration – To be attesting witness to codicil Registrar should attest signature of testator in manner contemplated by S. 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Codicil dictated by testator of Will in presence of witness and Registrar – Signed by testator in presence of witness and Registrar – Both Registrar and witness put their signatures with a view to attest signature of testator – However, neither the Registrar nor the witness called in witness-box to depose attestation – Codicil not proved.

Registration of document as codicil or Will – Does not dispense with need of proving execution and attestation of codicil/Will as per Evidence Act – Endorsements made by Registrar are relevant for registration purposes only. – [Bhagat Ram and Another v. Suresh and Others (2003 AIR SCW 6518)]

XII. Succession Act, 1925, Ss. 220, 227 – Probate or Letters of Administration – Grant of – Does confer title to property – But merely enables administration of estate of deceased – Testamentary Court is only concerned with finding out whether or not testator executed the testamentary instrument of his free Will. – [Mrs. Vijay C. Gurshaney & Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority (2003 AIR SCW 4158)]

XIII. Hindu Succession Act — Father-in-law of the widow governed by Mitakshara school died intestate. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 would apply in respect of joint family property but thereunder only widow of the said father-in-law and not widow of his son would be entitled to a claim. Hence the said widow of the son acquired no right under the Act. [Ram Vishal (Dead by L. Rs. and Others v. Jagan Nath and Another (2004) 9 SCC 302]

XIV. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (78 of 1956) — Adoption of son does not deprive adoptive mother of power to dispose of her separate property by transfer or by will. [Ugre Gowdav v. Nagegowda (D) by L. Rs. (2004) AIR SCW 4308].

XV. Proving of Will — Onus to establish allegations of undue influence, fraud or coercion is on the persons making such allegations. Proof in either case should be one of satisfaction of a prudent man. [Sridevi and Others v. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 784]

XVI. Genuineness of unregistered will — The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and proof of the signature of the testator, as required by law, is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain all legitimate suspicions to the satisfaction of the court before it accepts the Will as genuine. [Meenakshiammal (dead) through L. Rs. v. Chandrsekaran & Another (2005) 1 SCC 280].

XVII. Primary evidence sufficient to discharge the onus — Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence.

In order to assess as to whether the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. [Daulat Ram and Others v. Sodha and Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 40]

XVIII. Under section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, the grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked if the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; or the grant being obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by suppressing from the Court something material to the case or if the grant was obtained by means of untrue allegation or if the grantee has wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to exhibit an inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of Chapter – VII of Part – IX of the Indian Succession Act.

The Supreme Court in the case of Crystal Developers v. Asha Lata Ghosh [(2005) 9 SCC 375] held that reading sections 211, 227 along with section 263, it is clear that revocation of the grant shall operate prospectively and such revocation shall not invalidate the bona fide intermediate acts performed by the grantee during the pendency of the probate.

XIX. All that the succession certificate purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons. Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased. A succession certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged. The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. [Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) & Another (2005) 4 SCC 449]

XX. The Court empowered to grant letters of administration ordinarily may not go into the question of title in respect of property sought to be bequeathed by the testator; the situation would be different where the authority of the testator to execute a Will in relation to the subject matter thereof is in question.

[Jayamma v. Maria Bai dead by proposed Lrs. & Anr. (2004) 7 SCC 459 SC]

XXI. Sec. 6 of Hindu Succession Act – when a coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in Class I, his undivided interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would not devolve upon the surviving coparcener, by survivorship but upon his heirs by intestate succession.

Anar Devi and Others, Appellants vs. Parmeshwari Devi and Others, Respondents. [2006-(008)-SCC-0656 –SC]

XXII. Application of the Hindu Succession Act to the situation of a son being borne prior and subsequent to the enactment of the said Act.

Sheela Devi & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Anr. [2006-(008)-SCC -0581–SC]

XXIII. When the surviving heirs of the deceased had already partitioned the properties and became owners to the extent of their respective share, in such circumstances the property ceases to be joint family property. All the succeeding heirs succeed to their respective shares not as joint tenants but as tenants-in-common. The property devolves upon them not per strips but per capita with the right to alienate the share, particularly when the property has been partitioned and entries made in the revenue record of rights.

A. Provisions regarding devolution of property in coparcenary property are not applicable when the surviving members of the coparcenary had already partitioned their properties and became owners to the extent of their share.

B. When the coparcenary is discontinued, the property ceases to be joint family property and all the succeeding heirs succeed to their respective shares not as joint tenants but as tenants-in-common. The property devolves upon them not per stripes but per capita with the right to alienate the share, particularly when the property has been partitioned and entries made in the revenue record of rights.

Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran and Others [(2008) 3 SCC 87]

One B was the owner of the property. He died leaving behind his son S and three daughters. The properties in suit were then partitioned between S and his sisters. Their names were mutated in the revenue records of rights and their shares were shown to be ¼th each. Thereafter, the appellant, who was the son of S, was born. Subsequently, S transferred a part of the properties firstly by way of mortgage and thereafter by sale in favour of the respondents. On the premise that the properties of B were joint family properties, the appellant filed a suit for setting aside the said alienations on the ground, inter alia, that the said transaction was done without any legal necessity therefor. The trial court decreed the suit but the appellate court set aside the decree and held that upon the death of B, S became a co-sharer in the property and the property lost the character of ancestral property in terms of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. A second appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. The appellant then filed the present appeal by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that B left behind S and three daughters. In terms of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”), therefore, the properties of B devolved upon S and his three sisters. Each had 1/4th share in the property. Apart from the legal position, factually the same was also reflected in the record-of-rights. A partition had taken place amongst the heirs of B.

The first appellate court rightly held that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act was not attracted to the facts of the case as S and his sisters having partitioned their properties became owners to the extent of 1/4th share each, he had the requisite right to transfer the lands falling within his share.

It was rightly held that having regard to Section 8 as also Section 19 of the Act, the properties ceased to be joint family property and all the heirs and legal representatives of B would succeed to his interest as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Therefore, the properties devolved upon them per capita and not per stripes, each one of them was entitled to alienate their share, particularly when different properties were allotted in their favour. In a case of this nature, the joint coparcenary did not continue.

XXIV. When a Hindu female in lieu of her right to maintenance acquires property, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right. When her right as a co-owner by virtue of the provisions of the Act is crystallised, such acquisition would fall under section 14(1) and not under section 14(2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting or recognising the acquisition of the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. Therefore, on her death such property devolves on her heirs.

Where property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of her right to maintenance it is in virtue of a pre-existing right. When her right as a co-owner by virtue of provisions of the Act is crystallised such acquisition would fall under S. 14(1) and not under S. 14(2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting or reorganising the acquisition of the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property.

Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another [(2008) 1 SCC 465)]

A suit was filed by S, first wife of T in 1964 against M and K. A consent decree dated 20.7.1964 was passed in that suit, the relevant clauses of which were that as per the compromise certain land measuring 6 acres 33 guntas was given to S for her maintenance; that she had been in possession of that portion of land for 5-6 years; that the defendants would not interfere and obstruct the peaceful possession of that portion of land by S, till her death. On the other hand it was provided that S would not alienate (through gift or sale) the land which had been given for her maintenance. That after the death of S the land given to her would revert to Defendants 1 and 2.

The respondents who were heirs and legal representatives of S filed a suit claiming the said land admeasuring 6 acres 33 guntas on the ground that S had become owner thereof in terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (the Act). The appellants who were arrayed in the suit as defendants inter alia contended that S was not the absolute owner of the said property, the same having been allotted to her by reason of the consent decree. It was furthermore contended that the land in suit was allotted to her by way of maintenance which, she could keep in possession only during her lifetime and, therefore, Section 14(2) of the Act and not Section 14(1) of the Act would apply. The suit having been decreed on first appeal, which decree had been upheld on second appeal by the impugned judgment, the appellant-defendants were before the Supreme Court thereagainst by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal with costs of Rs.10,000, the Supreme Court Held:
“Where the property is given to a female Hindu towards her maintenance after the commencement of the Act (as in the present case) she becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is placed in possession of the said property (unless, of course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding the limitations and restrictions contained in the instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is given to her. This proposition follows from the words of Section 14(1), which insofar as is relevant read: “any property possessed by a female Hindu…. after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner”. In other words, though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate provided such property is given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession.”

“Section 14(2) is confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. Where the property is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of her right to maintenance, inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the property.”

XXV. The heirs of a female Hindu include the agnates of her husband. The deceased had left properties in two different States in India. A probate petition was filed mentioning one property situated in Bombay and accordingly the probate was granted by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court held that the non-publication of citation in another State, in which the second property is situated, is a ground for revocation of the probate.

A. The heirs of a female Hindu include the agnates of her husband.

Basanti Devi vs. Ravi Prakash Ram Prasad Jaiswal [(2008) 1 SCC 267]

L, widow of one M executed a will in favour of the respondent herein who was one of the grandsons of one of the brothers of M. The appellant herein was the widow of one of the sons of another brother of M. She claimed that L had executed another will in her favour on a subsequent date. Whereas the appellant did not file any application for grant of probate, the respondent did so. In his application, the respondent stated, inter alia, that the testator had left property within Greater Bombay in the State of Maharashtra. Accordingly, citations were published only at Bombay. By an amendment to the said application the appellant added that the testator had left property elsewhere also in India. However, he did not specify those places. It was further stated that there was no heir known to the petitioner on the side of the husband of the deceased. The schedule of assets allegedly left by the deceased was also inserted in the schedule of the properties mentioning a piece of land situate in U.P. However, no citation was made in U.P. A probate was granted in favour of the respondent by the High Court. The appellant made an application for revocation of the said grant of probate herein, inter alia, on the premise that although she was one of the heirs of L, no citation was made in U.P. She added that a will had also been executed in her favour. A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed that application on the ground that a public notice had been issued before issuing a probate but the applicant had neither filed any caveat nor filed any objection. An appeal thereagainst was dismissed by a Division Bench on the premise that the appellant was not a legal heir of the deceased as she was an agnate. The appellant then filed the present appeal by special leave.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that:(i) an agnate was also an heir in terms of the Hindu Succession Act, (ii) the application in question was entertainable in view of Explanation (c) to Section 263 of the Succession Act irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellant had any notice of the probate of the said will or not, and (iii) the probate was granted without complying with Section 283(3) of the Succession Act.

On the other hand, the respondent contended that in terms of the Rules framed by the Bombay High Court, it was not necessary to make any citation in the State of U.P.

Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the Probate Court, the Supreme Court held that Section 3(f) of the Hindu Succession Act defines “heir” to mean any person male or female, who is entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under the Act. Section 15 of the Act lays down the general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus and provides for devolution of property, under certain conditions, upon heirs of the husband. For the purpose of ascertaining as to who would be heirs of the husband if the deceased did not leave any sons and daughters or husband, reference has to be made to Section 8 of the Act. In view of Section 8(c), it is not correct to say that agnates of the deceased are not heirs.

In view of Rule 683 of the Bombay High Court Rules, it is not correct to contend that no citation in regard to the heirs of L was necessary.

B. Where the deceased left properties in two different States but due to non-disclosure of one of them, probate was granted without issuance of citation in that State, an application for revocation of the probate would be maintainable and the non-publication of citation can be a ground to revoke the probate.

The Supreme Court held that the respondent did not, at the first instance, disclose that any property belonging to the testator was situated at a place other than the State of Maharashtra. Such disclosure was required to be made in terms of Section 283(3). Citations were also required to be published by the District Judge concerned in terms thereof. In the application for amendment of the application a vague statement was made. Even therein it was not disclosed that another property was situated in the State of U.P. The provisions contained in Section 283(3) are mandatory in nature. Once the statutory requirements are found to have not been complied with, an application for revocation of the grant of probate would be maintainable in terms of Section 263 of the Act, apart from the fact that non-publication of citation could be one of the grounds to revoke the grant of probate. Explanation (c) appended thereto would be attracted in such a case. It may, therefore, be permissible for the appellant to show that a will was executed by L in her favour also.

Grant of probate being a judgment in rem, a person, who is aggrieved thereby and who had no knowledge about the proceedings and proper citations were not been made, is entitled to file an application for revocation of probate on such grounds as may be available to him. Therefore, the application for revocation of the grant of probate should have been entertained.”

XXVI Where a terminally ill testator makes the will just two weeks before his death and minor children are disinherited in favour of the niece and also a number of suspicious circumstances remain unexplained, the genuineness of the will is doubtful.

Where a terminally ill testator makes the will just two weeks before his death and minor children are disinherited in favour of the niece and also a number of suspicious circumstances remain unexplained, the genuineness of the will is doubtful.

Adivekka and Others vs. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead) by Lrs and Another [(2007) 7 SCC 91]

The Appellants were wife and children of one Hanumanthappa, the testator. He admittedly was suffering from cancer. He expired on 11.09.1988. Just two weeks prior to his death, viz., 25.08.1988, he allegedly executed the will in favour of Respondent No. 1 herein bequeathing in her favour the lands in question. The Appellants were not aware of the execution of the said will. They applied for mutation of their names after the death of Hanumanthappa. An objection thereto was raised by Respondent No.1. Allegedly, in the meantime, Respondent No. 1 had also sold the suit lands in favour of Respondent No. 2 by a deed of sale dated 16.03.1989.

On the aforementioned premise, the appellants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that the land in question was purchased by Hanumanthappa by sale of family gold and, thus, was a joint family property. It was also alleged that the will in question was a fabricated document.

The respondents in their written statements, however, averred that the will was a genuine document.

One of the issues that were framed by the learned trial Judge related to the execution of the will. It reads as under:

“(4) Whether the defendant No. 1 proves that she has become full owner of the suit property on the basis of the will dated 25.8.88 legally executed by the deceased Hanumanthappa?”

The Defendant-Respondent No. 1 herein did not examine herself. She examined her husband in whose favour she had allegedly executed a power of attorney. A purported attesting witness and the Sub-Registrar who registered the document were also examined.

The learned trial Judge decreed the suit. The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned judgment reversed the said judgment and decree opining that the execution of the will has been proved by DWs 4 and 5.

Allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court held as under:

“Grave suspicion in regard to the execution of the will arises as husband of the respondent being her power-of-attorney holder spoke of an agreement for sale. If he was right, he would have tendered the balance amount. He could have filed a suit for specific performance. At least a notice in that behalf could have been served. Husband of respondent, therefore, admittedly had an eye over the property. Why only the agricultural land possessed by H would be the subject-matter of the will has not been proved. The disposition made in the will is unfair, unnatural and improbable, as no sane person, save and except for very cogent reasons, would disinherit his minor children. WD 1 did not state as to from where and how he obtained possession of the original will.

“Where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to remove suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. Section 63 of the Succession Act lays down the mode and manner in which an unprivileged will is to be executed. Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner in which proof of execution of document is required by law to be attested. It in unequivocal terms states that execution of will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. The proof of a will is required not as a ground of reading the document but to afford the judge reasonable assurance of it as being what it purports to be. There exists distinction where suspicions are well founded and the cases where there are only suspicions alone. Existence of suspicious circumstances alone may not be sufficient. The court may not start with a suspicion and it should not close its mind to find the truth.”

XXVII. Party raising plea of partition has to prove the same since in law there is presumption in regard to continuance of joint family. Even separate possession of portion of property by co-sharers itself would not lead to presumption of partition. Several other factors are required to be considered therefore.

Party raising plea of partition has to prove the same since in law there is presumption in regard to continuance of joint family. Even separate possession of portion of property by co-sharers itself would not lead to presumption of partition. Several other factors are required to be considered therefore.

Chinthamani Ammal vs. Nandgopal Gounder and Another [(2007) 4 SCC 163]

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held as under:

“In law there exists a presumption in regard to the continuance of a joint family. The party, which raises a plea of partition, is to prove the same. Even separate possession of portion of the property by the co-sharers itself would not lead to a presumption of partition. Several other factors are required to be considered therefor.

“Before the trial Judge, the parties adduced their respective evidences. The trial judge had occasion to look to the demeanour of the witnesses. He came to the conclusion that the properties in suit had all along been held as a joint family property opining that the father of the appellant did not have any divided status as alleged or at all. The first appellate court reversed the said finding relying only on or on the basis of the statement made by DW 2, the aunt of the appellant. The said statement by itself does not prove that K made an unequivocal declaration that he intended to separate himself from his brother or the same was duly communicated to the other co-sharers. DW 2 did not say when such a declaration was made in presence of all coparceners. It was not stated that at the time of making such purported declaration, the respondents were present.”

“Furthermore, if having regard to the nature of oral evidences adduced before it, the trial Judge came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove her case, the first appellate court, as has rightly been held by the High Court, could not have reversed the said finding without assigning sufficient and cogent reasons therefor.”

XXVIII. The legally wedded wife is not automatically entitled to succession certificate to the exclusion of the second de facto wife and her children, when the deceased had made nomination in favour of the second wife to receive terminal benefits of his employment. Though the second de facto wife was not legally wedded wife, yet her children were legitimate for the purpose of share in their father’s employment dues. Therefore, the Court divided the property between the first wife and four children through the second wife equally.

The legally wedded wife is not automatically entitled to succession certificate to the exclusion of second de facto wife and her children, when the deceased had made nomination in favour of second wife to receive terminal benefits of his employment. Though the second de facto wife was not legally wedded wife, yet her children were legitimate for the purpose of share in their father’s employment dues.

Vidhyadhari and Others vs. Sukhrana Bai and Others. [(2008) 2 SCC 238]

Sheetaldeen was working as a CCM Helper in Mines P.K.1 of the Western Coalfields at Pathakheda and died on 9.5.1993 while in service. Two separate applications came to be filed under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act for obtaining succession certificate with respect to the movable properties of deceased Sheetaldeen, one of them was filed by Vidhyadhari while the other came to be filed by Sukhrana Bai. Both the cases were joined and tried together by the Trial Court, which allowed the application filed by Vidhyadhari (SC No.3/96) and dismissed the one filed by Sukhrana Bai. Sukhrana Bai, therefore, filed two Miscellaneous Appeals, which came to be allowed by the High Court in favour of Sukhrana Bai. Vidhyadhari, therefore, is before us in this appeal. The factual background of the case is that—

Admittedly, Sukhrana Bai was the first wife of Sheetaldeen, while during the subsistence of this marriage, Sheetaldeen got married with Vidhyadhari. Two sons and two daughters were born to Vidhyadhari, they being Smt. Savitri, Naresh @ Ramesh, Ms.Chanda @ Durga and Baliram, while Sukhrana Bai does not have any children.

Vidhyadhari in her application before the trial court (SC No.3 of 1996), besides herself, disclosed the names of her children as the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. It was also revealed that deceased Sheetaldeen had nominated her for receiving amounts under the Provident Fund, Family Pension Scheme and Coal Mines Deposits Life Scheme. She also disclosed that she has received a sum of Rs.45,036/- towards gratuity amount of the deceased from the employer of Sheetaldeen, i.e., Western Coalfields Ltd. She, therefore, claimed the succession certificate on the basis of the nominations besides her marriage with Sheetaldeen.

The Honourable Supreme Court accepted the finding of the High Court that Sukhrana Bai was the legally wedded wife while Vidhyadhari could not claim that status.

The High Court almost presumed that succession certificate can be applied for only by the legally wedded wife to the exclusion of anybody else. The High Court completely ignored the admitted situation that this succession certificate was for the purposes of collecting the provident fund, Life Cover Scheme, pension and amount of life insurance and amount of other dues in the nature of death benefits of Sheetaldeen. That Vidhyadhari was a nominee is not disputed by anyone and is, therefore proved. Vidhyadhari had claimed the succession certificate mentioning therein the names of four children whose status as legitimate children of Sheetaldeen could not and cannot be disputed.

The High Court should have realised that Vidhyadhari was not only a nominee but also was the mother of four children of Sheetaldeen who were the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen and whose names were also found in Form A which was the declaration of Sheetaldeen during his lifetime. In her application Vidhyadhari candidly pointed out the names of the four children as the legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. No doubt that she herself has claimed to be a legal heir which status she could not claim but besides that she had the status of a nominee of Sheetaldeen. She continued to stay with Sheetaldeen as his wife for long time and was a person of confidence for Sheetaldeen who had nominated her for his provident fund, Life Cover Scheme, pension and amount of life insurance and amount of other dues. Under such circumstances she was always preferable even to the legally wedded wife like Sukhrana Bai who had never stayed with Sheetaldeen as his wife and who had gone to the extent of claiming the succession certificate to the exclusion of legal heirs of Sheetaldeen. In the grant of succession certificate the court has to use its discretion where the rival claims, as in this case, are made for the succession certificate for the properties of the deceased. The High Court should have taken into consideration these crucial circumstances. Merely because Sukhrana Bai was the legally wedded wife that by itself did not entitle her to a succession certificate in comparison to Vidhyadhari who all through had stayed as the wife of Sheetaldeen, had borne his four children and had claimed a succession certificate on behalf of children also. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in granting the claim of Sukhrana Bai to the exclusion not only of the nominee of Sheetaldeen but also to the exclusion of his legitimate legal heirs.

Therefore, though we agree with the High Court that Sukhrana Bai was the only legitimate wife yet, we would choose to grant the certificate in favour of Vidhyadhari who was his nominee and the mother of his four children. However, we must balance the equities as Sukhrana Bai is also one of the legal heirs and besides the four children she would have the equal share in Sheetaldeen’s estate, which would be 1/5th. To balance the equities we would, therefore, choose to grant succession certificate to Vidhyadhari but with a rider that she would protect the 1/5th share of Sukhrana Bai in Sheetaldeen’s properties and would hand over the same to her. As the nominee she would hold the 1/5th share of Sukhrana Bai in trust and would be responsible to pay the same to Sukhrana Bai. We direct that for this purpose she would give a security in the trial court to the satisfaction of the trial court.

XXIX. The son inherited 1/3rd share by will on death of his father in 1975. The son died in 1976. His widow remarried in 1979. Upon the death of her husband, his share vested absolutely in the widow by operation of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Such absolute vesting cannot be subjected to divestment, save and except by reason of a statute. Sections 4 and 24 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 prevail over the provisions contained in section 2 of the Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act, 1856.

The son inherited 1/3^rd share by will on death of his father in 1975.  The son died in 1976.  His widow remarried in 1979. Upon the death of her husband, his share vested absolutely in the widow by operation of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.  Such absolute vesting cannot be subjected to divestment, save and except by reason of a statute.

Cherotte Sugathan (Dead) Through Lrs. and Others vs. Cherotte Bharathi and Others [(2008) 2 SCC 610]

The properties in dispute belonged to one Shri Pervakutty. He allegedly executed a will on 11.10.1975 bequeathing the said properties in favour of his sons.

The first respondent remarried one Elambilakkat Sudharkaran. Sudhakaran died on 12.9.1979. She filed a suit on 31.12.1985 for partition claiming 1/3rd share in the suit property. The appellant herein, inter alia, contended that she, in terms of Section 2 of the Hindu Widows’ Re-marriage Act, 1856, having ceased to have any right in the properties inherited by her from her husband Sukumaran, the suit was not maintainable.

By a judgment and order dated 31.3.1992, the said suit for partition was decreed declaring 1/3rd share in the suit properties in favour of the first respondent.

By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the respondent 2 and 3 holding:

“In this case, the plaintiff has claimed succession on the basis of will. If that be so, the lower court was correct in holding that Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to defendants 1 and 2. But if the succession is not on the basis of will, then defendants 1 and 2 will be entitled to the benefit of Section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act.”

The Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act was enacted to remove all legal obstacles to the marriage of Hindu widows. Section 1 of the said Act encompasses within its fold the said legal policy. Section 2 reads as under:

“2. Rights of widow in deceased husband’s property to cease on her re-marriage. - All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband’s property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband to his lineal successors, or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall upon her remarriage cease and determine as if she had then died; and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same.”

Applicability of the said provision must be tested having regard to the provisions contained in Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 4 of the Act provides for the overriding effect of the Act stating:

“4. Overriding effect of Act. – Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, –
(a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act;

(b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to Hindus insofar as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act.”

The Act brought about a sea change in Shastric Hindu Law. Hindu widows were brought on equal footing in the matter of inheritance and succession along with the male heirs. Section 14(1) stipulates that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, will be held by her as a full owner thereof. Section 24, as it then stood, reads as under:

“24. Certain widows remarrying may not inherit as widows. –Any heir who is related to an intestate as the widow of a predeceased son, the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son or the widow of a brother shall not be entitled to succeed to the property of the intestate as such widow, if on the date the succession opens, she has remarried.”

Upon the death of Sukumaran, his share vested in the first respondent absolutely. Such absolute vesting of property in her could not be subjected to divestment, save and except by reason of a statute.

2.18 Section 58 of IS Act provides that the testamentary succession amongst the Hindus is to be governed by the
general Hindu law modified by what has been provided for in section 57 and Schedule III of the Indian Succession Act.

Comparative Chart

	Indian Succession Act	Hindu Succession Act
To whom applicable :	The IS Act, 1925, is applicable to all Indians other than Muslims. However certain provisions of the Indian Succession Act are not applicable to Hindus and apply only to non-Hindus such as Christians, Parsis and Jews. Intestate succession to properties of any person other than Hindu, Mohammedan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain is governed by Part V (i.e., Intestate Succession) of the Indian Succession Act. Rules for Parsi are contained in sections 50 to 56 of the I. S. Act.	The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, applies to any person who is a Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. Clause (i) of section 5 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that the said Act does not apply to any property, succession of which is regulated by the IS Act by reason of the provisions contained in section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Sec. 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, reads as under: "Notwithstanding any restrictions contained in the IS Act, 1925, with respect to its application to members of certain communities, succession to the property of any person whose marriage is solemnized under this Act and to the property of the issue of such marriage shall be regulated by the provisions of the said Act and for the purposes of this section that Act shall have effect as if Chapter III of Part V (Special Rules for Parsi Intestates) had been omitted therefrom."
Attesting witness to a Will :	In case of Wills executed by Christians, Jews and Parsis a person named as executor in the Will can be an attesting witness. Attestation by a legatee under the Will is a good attestation. But the bequest in favour of such a legatee or his spouse becomes void. A gift to an attesting witness is void though there may be a sufficient number of attesting witnesses without him, and the undisposed portion of the devised property will devolve according to the law of inheritance. (Section 67 of Indian Succession Act)	In case of Wills executed by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains, the bequest in favour of a legatee is valid though he has attested the said Will. So a legatee under the Will of a Hindu will not lose his legacy by attesting the Will.
Probate :	In the case of Wills made by Christians and Jews and by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains [as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57 of the Indian Succession Act,] no right as an executor or a legatee can be established in a Court of Justice unless Probate is granted by a Court of competent jurisdiction u/s. 213 of the Indian Succession Act. Wills executed outside the cities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay in respect of immovable properties situate outside these cities are not subject to the condition of obtaining probate before getting advantage of any such Will.	No probate is required to establish right as an executor or a legatee in case of Wills made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains. The exception to the above rule is provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 57 of the IS Act which is to the following effect: All Wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains within the territories of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts at Madras and Bombay have to be probated. All Wills and codicils made outside the territories or limits mentioned in clause (i) above so far as relates to immovable property situate within those territories or limits have to be probated.
Letter of Administration:	Where a person dies intestate who was governed by the IS Act, it is obligatory for the executors or legatee to obtain a Letter of Administration.	Where a Hindu dies intestate it is not necessary in every case to obtain a Letter of administration to the estate of the deceased to establish a right to any part of the property of the deceased.
Revocation of Will by testator’s marriage :	Every Will shall be revoked on the marriage by the maker u/s. 69 of Indian Succession Act. Revocation results not only from first marriage but any subsequent marriage also.	This provision does not apply to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains who are governed by the Hindu Succession Act.
	The exception to this rule is that a Will made in exercise of a power of appointment, when the property over which the power of appointment is exercised would not, in default of such appointment, pass to his or her executor or administrator or to the person entitled in case of intestacy.	The statement of objects and reasons of the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 (now repealed) brings out the reasons for a marriage amongst the Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs or Jains not having the effect of revoking a Will as the marriage does not create such a change in the testator’s condition as to raise a presumption that he would not adhere to a Will made previously. This presumption is based upon the principle of monogamous marriage (the practice of having only one husband or wife at any one time) in England.
Revocation of Privileged Will or Codicil :	Under section 72 of IS Act, a privileged Will or codicil may be revoked by the testator by an unprivileged Will or codicil, or by any act expressing an intention to revoke it and accompanied by such formalities as would be sufficient to give validity to a privileged Will or by the burning, tearing or destroying the same with the intention of revoking the same.	Section 72 of IS Act, 1925 is not applicable to Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains.
Construction of terms/definitions and interpretation :	Section 97 of IS Act lays down the general principles of interpretation of Wills. Though this section is not applicables to Hindus, it can still be equally applied to a Will by a Hindu, if the clear intention of the testator cannot be gathered from such Will. It may, however, be noted that the principle of interpretation enacted by this section, in terms, is applicable to testamentary dispositions and not to gifts or settlement.	Under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 following words are defined and interpreted u/s. 3 of the Act: (a) agnate (b) aliyasantana law (c) cognate (d) custom and usage (e) full blood, half blood and uterine blood (f) heir   (g) intestate (h) marumakkattayam law (i) nambudri law (j) related
Bequest to religious or charitable use :	Section 118 of IS Act provides that no person having nephew or niece or any nearer relation, shall have power to bequeath any property to religious or charitable uses except the following two conditions are satisfied: a Will by which the testator bequeathed his property to religious or charitable uses was executed not less than twelve months before the death of the testator, and such Will was deposited within six months from its execution in some place provided by law for the safe custody.	Section 118 of the IS Act is not applicable in case of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains. In other words, a Will of a Hindu though not executed before twelve months of his death and though not deposited within six months from its execution for the safe custody, is a valid will which is containing a bequest of his property for religious or charitable uses.
Words expressing relationship :	Section 100 of the IS Act provides that in absence of any intimation to the contrary in a Will the word child, son or daughter would mean legitimate child, son or daughter. The principles laid down in this section is that a testator must be presumed to intend his legitimate relations unless the Will itself contains an intimation to the contrary.	The word son, daughter or child means legitimate as well as illegitimate child. The illegitimate son of a male Hindu of any caste is entitled to claim maintenance from the father and in case of death of the father from his heirs out of his estate inherited by them so long as the illegitimate son remains a minor and does not cease to be a Hindu.
Testamentary guardian :	A father, whatever his age may be, may by Will appoint a guardian or guardians for his child during minority. This section provides that a father though he may be a minor may appoint a guardian by Will for his child. (Section 60 of IS Act, 1925)	Under sec. 9 of the Minority and Guardianship Act, a Hindu father, mother and widow may by Will appoint a guardian for his minor legitimate as well as illegitimate children or in respect of minor’s property or in respect of both, subject to the conditions laid down in that section.